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Special Issues and Topics
Imagery, Humor, and the Judicial Opinion
I like to think that the work of a judge is an art .... After all,
why isn't it in the nature of an art? It is a bit of craftsmanship, isn't
it? It is what a poet does, it is what a sculptor does. He has some
vague purposes and he has an indefinite number of what you might
call frames of preference among which he must choose; for choose he
has to, and he does.
Learned Hand'
Judicial humor is a dreadful thing. In the first place, the jokes
are usually bad; I have seldom heard a judge utter a good one.
There seems to be something about the judicial ermine which puts its
wearer in the same general class with the ordinary radio comedian.
He just is not funny. In the second place, the bench is not an appro-
priate place for unseemly levity. The litigant has vital interests at
stake. His entire future, or even his life, may be trembling in the
balance, and the robed buffoon who makes merry at his expense
should be choked with his own wig.
William Prosser2
I. INTRODUCTION
From time immemorial, judges, more so than lawyers, have been
acknowledged as the high priests of the religion we call law.3 As
1. Remarks at Proceedings of a Special Session of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Commemoration of Judge Learned Hand's Completion of Fifty Years of
Federal Service, quoted in H. SHANKS, THE ART AND CRAFT OF JUDGING: THE DECISIONS
OF JUDGE LEARNED HAND, at flyleaf (1968). For a collection of Judge Hand's papers and
addresses, see I. DILLIARD, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY (1960).
2. W. PROSSER, THE JUDICIAL HUMORIST vii (1952). Despite this comment, Prosser
apparently thought enough of legal humor to write a book on the subject.
3. "[M]any have noted the similarity between the judiciary and the priesthood-the black
robes, the stylized formulae of address, the sanctification of the witness's testimony by a hand
on the holy book." Hyland, A Defense of Legal Writing, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 599, 604 (1986).
See also Winter, Tennessee v. Garner and the Democratic Practice of Judicial Review, 14
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 679, 696 (1986) ("We surround our courts with ritual and
mystique and accord our judges, like a secular priesthood, with distinctive honor."); cf. D.
MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 453 (1963) ("[T]he language of the law depends
for survival upon those it unites in priesthood-the lawyers."); F. RODELL, WOE UNTO YOU
LAWYERS! 3 (1939) ("In tribal times, there were medicine-men. In the Middle Ages, there
were the priests. Today there are the lawyers."). The religious metaphor, applicable to law
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such, they have come to personify the aura that surrounds the legal
system and its attendant rituals. The image of the stern, sober, larger-
than-life judge looking down at the defendant from a lofty bench was
prevalent in the earlier days of Anglo-American jurisprudence. In
Gilbert and Sullivan's Trial by Jury, for example, the judge, upon
entering the courtroom, is greeted by the following chorus:
All hail, great judge!
To you bright rays
We never grudge




Reversed in banc. All Hail!
4
The view that judges are omnipotent and god-like still lingers,
but public and professional perceptions of the judiciary have changed
radically in the past fifty years. The work of legal realists5 and critical
because both law and religion involve the explication of society's moral values, continues to
appear in current literature concerning judicial review. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 138, 162 (1980). Anthony Amsterdam
has compared the role of the Supreme Court to that of the priestess of the Oracle at Delphi.
See Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 785, 785- 86, 793 (1970).
The perception of law as something mystical was probably reinforced, if not engendered,
by the formal view of the judicial process-that judicial decisions were the "mechanical result
of the application of antecedent rules to the facts of particular cases," and that "[]udges ha[d]
virtually no freedom in the selection or interpretation of these rules." W. RUMBLE,
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 49 (1968). In the words of Sir William Blackstone, "[judges] are
the depositories of the laws; the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt ... not
according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the
land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one." I W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69. If the judicial process was truly mechanical, however, we
would hardly need gods to implement it. Predictably, the formalist view is not shared by
modern writers. For different descriptions of how judges decide "hard" cases, see R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1978); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of
Laws and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 606-14 (1958).
4. W. GILBERT & A. SULLIVAN, TRIAL BY JURY (1875), reprinted in W. GILBERT, THE
SAVOY OPERAS 6 (1926). The two playwrights seemed to have a knack for satirizing
contemporary attitudes about the law. In lolanthe, the Lord Chancellor sings:
The Law is the true embodiment
Of everything that's excellent
It has no kind of fault or flaw,
And I, my Lords, embody the Law.
W. GILBERT & A. SULLIVAN, IOLANTHE, Act 1 (1882), reprinted in W. GILBERT, THE SAVOY
OPERAS 212 (1926). For a humorous treatment of lolanthe, see Buchmeyer, Judicial Ethics:
The lolanthe Report, TEX. B.J., Oct. 1981, at 1169-70.
5. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(1962).
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legal theorists6 has demystified the images created by the formal view
of law and the judiciary by pointing out what had been suspected all
along: that judges have failings and that they necessarily make law
7
because of the need to interpret and the indeterminacy of legal argu-
ment. More and more, judges are portrayed and perceived as the
human beings they have always been.8
This realist perception of judges has consequences for judicial
writing and the use of imagery and humor. Although judges in the
eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries used imagery to
adorn their pronouncements, the use of figurative language is more
likely to be accepted today because of the realist view. Judges' person-
alities, training, education, prejudices, and views of their role are
bound to shape in some way the opinions they write and the way they
write them. Moreover, judges-appellate judges in particular-
should be considered professional writers, for they will often be
judged by what appears on a written page. Consequently, "[w]ords-
the right words-matter" to judges and underscore their status as
writers.9 Because "the judge has at his disposal the various stylistic
and rhetorical devices that the essayist has available to him,"' 0 it is
not surprising to find that some judges use different literary devices to
help explain their reasoning and get their points across. I  As Irving
6. See, e.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685 (1976); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563
(1983).
7. See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 3-7 (1985).
8. Television programs today depict different aspects of the legal system more
realistically. L.A. Law, NBC's critically acclaimed depiction of life in a small Los Angeles law
firm, often focuses on the human frailties of judges and lawyers. In the NBC comedy series
Night Court, Judge Harry Stone, a practical joker turned judge, conducts his courtroom in an
informal manner-laughter is the only formality that is adhered to. Judging from the success
of both programs, it appears that television executives and the American people alike feel
comfortable in dealing with the law and the judiciary on a personal level.
Recent books on the Supreme Court, by describing the "inner workings" of the Court and
the way cases are decided, have also helped to reshape the way the judiciary is viewed. See D.
O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1986); B.
WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979).
9. Domnarski, The Opinion as Essay, The Judge as Essayist.- Some Observation on Legal
Writing, 10 J. LEGAL PROF. 139, 141 (1985).
10. Id. at 144 (citation omitted).
11. Judges may face a dilemma in trying to write opinions that are figurative, quotable,
humorous, or unique. While they may want to forsake the wooden form of judicial opinion
writing (issue, facts, law, application, conclusion), they must, in some way, maintain the
dignity and integrity that, at least in part, gives the judiciary its legitimacy. Tennyson, writing
in the Victorian Age, described a similar problem faced by poets of that era. The poets wanted
to experience the life of the masses, but were afraid that such an experience would impair their
ability to write. Tennyson captured the essence of the dilemma in a poem about a lady who
wove a magic web in a tower near Camelot. She could only observe Camelot and its
surroundings by looking at the reflections in a mirror. If she looked toward Camelot, a curse
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Younger has noted, "[a] legal education needn't stifle literary
talent."'I2
This article is about the use of imagery' 3 and humor in judicial
opinions.' 4 Although in a sense it is really about judges who have had
the imagination, courage and ability to deviate from conventional
norms in writing their opinions, it is not an exhaustive compilation of
all colorful judicial opinions,I5 and does not pretend to rank or corn-
would fall upon her and kill her. Although she was "half sick of shadows," she was afraid to
risk looking at Camelot. A glance at Sir Lancelot, however, forced her to take a chance:
A bowshot from her bower eaves
He rode between the barley sheaves,
The sun came dazzling through the leaves,
And flamed upon the brazen greaves
of bold Sir Lancelot.
A red-cross knight forever kneeled
To a lady in his shield,
That sparkled on the yellow field.
Beside remote Shalott.
His broad clear brow in sunlight glowed;
On burnished hooves his war horse trode;
From underneath his helmet flowed
His coal-black curls as on he rode,
As he rode down to Camelot.
From the bank and from the river
He flashed into the crystal mirror,
"Tirra lirra," by the river
Sang Sir Lancelot.
She left the wheel, she left the loom,
She made three paces through the room,
She saw the water lily bloom,
She saw the helmet and the plume,
She looked down to Camelot.
Out flew the web and floated wide;
The mirror cracked from side to side;
"The curse is come upon me," cried
The Lady of Shalott.
A. TENNYSON, THE LADY OF SHALOTT, Part III (1832). Tennyson's poem does not pretend
to solve the dilemma, but may suggest to judges that they sometimes have to take chances. The
consequences for judges, in any event, are bound to be less momentous than they were for
Tennyson's heroine-tempered use of humor and imagery is not likely to impair the judiciary's
ability to function. In addition, there are mechanisms to deal with judges who abuse their
power and freedom of expression. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
12. Younger, Legal Writing All-Stars, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1986, at 94.
13. Imagery is defined as "figurative language." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY
300 (1979).
14. As the excerpts in section three demonstrate, imagery and humor are not mutually
exclusive. Humorous opinions often contain imagery, and figurative language is sometimes
funny.
15. At the time this article went to print, the West Publishing Company had not yet
designated a key number for judicial opinions employing imagery or humor.
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pare the quality of the opinions considered. Rather, it simply cele-
brates the prankster and poet in all of us.
The second section of this article begins by briefly summarizing
the conflicting viewpoints on the place of humor and imagery in judi-
cial opinions and presents a defense of creative judicial writing. The
next section, section three, compiles colorful judicial opinions, focus-
ing on two judges who are famous for their unique writing styles. The
last section, a brief essay on colorful opinion writing, concludes that
imagery and humor have a place in legal writing.
II. ALEKHINE's DEFENSE: 16 THE PROPRIETY OF
IMAGERY AND HUMOR
Much has been written about the problems associated with legal
writing."7 One attorney has described it as "mountains of dreary
drivel, so formal, heavy and pedantic, unleavened by spritely humor
or sparkling language, rhythm or rhyme."' 8 For years, and without
much success, commentators, educators, judges, and lawyers have
urged the legal profession to write clearly and in a way that most
people can understand. Many have criticized the hyper-technical
nature of legal writing (e.g., wills and contracts), arguing that the dif-
ficult language prevents the public (and some lawyers and judges)
from understanding what is really being said. Both lawyers and non-
lawyers have revolted against the monopolization of the existing legal
system by lawyers by trying to help people solve their legal problems
in unorthodox ways. 19
The dogmatic style of legal writing used by lawyers may be
attributed to the fact that lawyers are concerned only with their cli-
16. I have entitled this section "Alekhine's Defense" because of the parallels between that
chess opening and the use of imagery and humor by judges. In Alekhine's Defense (1.P-K4,
Kt-KB3), Black, rather than trying to control the center, allows White to advance his center
pawns in the hope that those pawns will be weakened. Like imagery and humor, the defense
involves some risk, see R. FINE, IDEAS BEHIND THE CHESS OPENINGS 95-99 (1949), but can
pay off handsomely if used appropriately.
17. See, e.g., Lindgren, Style Matters: A Review Essay on Legal Writing, 92 YALE L.J. 161
(1982); Raymond, Legal Writing: An Obstruction to Justice, 30 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1978); Stark,
Why Lawyers Can't Write, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1389 (1984); Wydick, Plain English for Lawyers,
66 CALIF. L. REV. 727 (1978). Not all of the commentary, however, has been critical. See,
e.g., Friedman, Law and Its Language, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 563 (1964); Hyland, A Defense
of Legal Writing, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 599 (1986).
18. Goodheim, Literary Style and Legal Writing or Why Not Throw Some Literary Effort
into Preparing Mr. Blackstone's Chowder, 37 N.Y. ST. B.J. 529, 529 (1965).
19. Many organizations have campaigned against the over-legalization of American
society, and some nonlawyers (such as paralegals) have begun to offer legal advice. Not
surprisingly, the legal profession has responded by charging these nonlawyers with the
unauthorized practice of law.
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ents' claims and do not worry about their clients (or anyone else, for
that matter) understanding legal jargon,2" but such a concern should
not operate to constrain judicial creativity. Judges do not have cli-
ents; their audience is the legal profession and, in a larger sense, the
public. Therefore, "[i]n developing an idea in the opinion that effects
on the whole of society, as opposed to asserting a principle to advance
a client's cause, the appellate judge can, and indeed should, draw
upon a wide range of cultural resources. "21
It is heartening that judges on occasion have turned to literature,
humor, and imagery in writing opinions and deciding cases. Judges in
England, for example, have long used figurative language to adorn or
explain their reasoning. In The King v. Shipley,22 a 1784 case, Lord
Mansfield quoted lines from a ballad in discussing the jury's function
in cases of seditious libel:
For Sir Phillip well knows
His innuendos
Will serve him no longer
In verse or prose;
For twelve honest men have decided the cause,
Who are judges of fact, though no judges of laws.23
The House of Lords, in Thomson v. Weems, 24 held that a life
insurance policy was null and void because the deceased had falsely
answered a question pertaining to his temperance. Lord Fitzgerald,
concurring, agreed that the deceased had not been temperate: "The
cause of death, too, is confirmation strongly of the [insured] having
fallen into that fatal habit which produces
'* * * * * all the kinds of maladies that lead to death's grim
cave
Wrought by intemperance.' ,2
Concurring in Southwark Borough Council v. Nightingale,26 Mr.
20. Domnarski, supra note 9, at 140. Nevertheless, lawyers seem to ignore the effect that
imagery can have in legal writing:
To the mnemonic device with the greatest possibilities-writing (in prose or in
rhyme) so unhackneyed that it pricks the dozing reader and disturbs the peace of
the quiet memory-lawyers give their least efforts. They have accustomed
themselves to the dullest prose in the world as though it were inevitable.
D. MELLINKOFF, supra note 3, at 439 (citations omitted).
21. Domnarski, supra note 9, at 143.
22. 99 Eng. Rep. 774 (K.B. 1784).
23. Id. at 823. Another judge quoted the ballad with approval in a civil slander case 140
years later. See Broome v. Agar, 138 L.T.R. 698, 699 (C.A. 1928) (Scrutton, L.J.).
24. 9 App. Cas. 671 (H.L. 1884).
25. Id. at 698 (Fitzgerald, L.J.). The insured had died of chronic hepatitis. Id. at 696-97.
26. 64 T.L.R. 563 (K.B. 1948).
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Justice Singleton included a ditty to illustrate the obscurity of certain
sections of an act passed by the London County Council:
"I thought when I learned my letters
That all my troubles were done,
But I find I am sadly mistaken
They have only just begun."
27
In Sydall v. Castings Ltd.,28 the Court of Appeal held that the
word "descendant," as used in an insurance policy, was a term of art,
and that an illegitimate child therefore did not qualify as a descen-
dant. Lord Denning dissented, arguing that the term should have
been given its ordinary meaning. 29 Lord Russell, borrowing from
Shakespeare, suggested that Lord Denning had been swayed by
sympathy:
I may perhaps be forgiven for saying that it appears to me that
Lord Denning M.R. has acceded to the appeal of Bassanio in the
Merchant of Venice.
Bassanio: "And, I beseech you, wrest once the law to your author-
ity: To do a great right, do a little wrong."
But Portia retorted:
Portia: "It must not be; there is no power in Venice
Can alter a decree established:
'Twill be recorded for a precedent,
And many an error, by the same example,
Will rush into the State: it cannot be."
I am a Portia man.3°
Commentators, and judges themselves, disagree as to the propri-
ety of humor and other literary devices in judicial opinions. Several
commentators on judicial opinion-writing advise judges to avoid using
humor, sarcasm, irony, and other figurative language. The author of a
handbook on opinion writing states that "sarcasm should never be
used, and humor should be avoided."'" Others believe that the use of
humor and imagery can be effective, 32 and that it adds life to the
27. Id. at 565 (Singleton, J.).
28. [1967] 1 Q.1. 302.
29. Id. at 308-13 (Denning, L.J.).
30. Id. at 321-22 (Russell, L.J.) (quoting W. SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE,
Act IV, scene 1).
31. J. GEORGE, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING HANDBOOK 7 (1981). See also Hopkins,
Notes on Style in Judicial Opinions, 8 TRIAL JUDGE J. 49, 51 (1969) ("Humor has a dubious
place in an opinion. It is not a universal commodity and the decision of the rights of the
parties is a serious matter.").
32. "Humor may also be an aid to remembrance, and need not be an outcast of legal
writing. All that a [judge] has to fear from humor is failure, and with the stakes so high (an
end to unmitigated dullness) the risk is sometimes worth taking." D. MELLINKOFF, supra note
3, at 442 (citations omitted). See also F. COOPER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL WRITING 36 (1953)
1987]
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otherwise rigid format 33 of judicial opinions. A syllabus on opinion
writing prepared for a federal circuit judges' conference, for example,
pointed out that "our big failure is lack of color: We are urged to
liven up the opinion by an occasional touch of humor, satire or figure
of speech."' 34 Judge (later Justice) Cardozo, acknowledged by many
as a great legal writer, appeared ambivalent on the issue:
Flashes of humor are not unknown, yet the form of opinion which
aims at humor from beginning to end is a perilous adventure,
which can be justified only by success, and even then is likely to
find its critics as many as its eulogists .... I would not convey the
thought that an opinion is the worse for being lightened by a smile.
I am merely preaching caution.... In days not far remote, judges
were not unwilling to embellish their deliverances with quotations
from the poets. I shall observe towards such a practice the tone of
decent civility that is due to those departed.35
Notwithstanding the disagreement over figurative language,
there exist several functional and theoretical justifications for the use
of humor and imagery in judicial opinions. First, such language helps
demystify law. At its most basic level, law is simply a restatement of
everyday disputes between people (or between the government and its
citizens). Law aggrandizes the dispute with the use of such lifeless
terms as "cause of action" and "litigation," and enshrines an other-
wise human problem in a formal legal setting. In what can be called
an act of self-legitimation, the law formalizes and thereby complicates
everything (including the language) surrounding the ultimate resolu-
tion of conflicts arising from everyday life experience.36 Imagery and
humor can reshape the dispute into the story that it originally was,
help bring the dispute back "down to earth," and dispel some of the
notions held by those affected by the legal system.
Second, humor and figurative language can help crystallize a
point, put it in context, and breathe life into the set of facts that the
law has formalized. Images and informal language make an opinion
("Judges can sometimes make good use of sarcasm. It can be highly persuasive, in the hands
of a master.").
33. Most judicial opinions are divided into five parts: (1) the nature of the action and how
it is before the court; (2) the issues; (3) a statement of the facts; (4) an analysis of the legal
issues; and (5) the disposition of the case. Leflar, Quality in Judicial Opinions, 3 PACE L. REV.
579, 582 (1983). For a comprehensive bibliography and survey of literature about writing
judicial opinions, see C. BOLDEN, APPELLATE OPINION PREPARATION (1978).
34. Witkin, Appellate Court Opinions-A Syllabus for Panel Discussion, 63 F.R.D. 515, 568
(1973).
35. B. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE 26-27, 29 (1931).
36. Most legal documents use the word "said" to designate the objects of controversies or
transactions ("said" contract, "said" car). Few, if any, of us would ask a fellow diner to "pass
the 'said' salt."
[Vol. 41:693
JUDICIAL IMAGERY AND HUMOR
much easier to read and understand. Consider, for example, Judge
Irving Goldberg's clear statement of the reasons why parties filing a
federal suit could not complain about a federal injuction prohibiting
them from pursuing state court remedies.
Appellants themselves issued the invitation to dance in the federal
ballroom, they chose their dancing partners, and at their own
request they were assigned a federal judge as their choreographer.
Now that the dance is over, appellants find themselves unhappy
with the judging of the contest. They urge us to reverse and
declare that "Good Night Ladies" should have been played with-
out the partial summary judgment having been granted and with-
out the preliminary injunction having been issued. This we have
declined to do, and in so doing we note that this is not The Last
Tango for the Parish. Appellants still have an encore to perform
and their day in court is not over.
3 7
Third, the use of imagery and humor is a way for judges, espe-
cially appellate judges, to achieve self-fulfillment and derive needed
satisfaction from their jobs. Because of the nature of their profession,
judges lead cloistered lives, devoid of much human interaction.38
Much of their time is spent inside chambers performing administra-
tive chores and writing decisions and memoranda. By writing cre-
atively judges can arguably derive more satisfaction from their work.
Fourth, because they show the lighter side of the law, imagery
and humor further illustrate the inherently human nature of law and
of those who are charged with administering it. When judges break
from the mold, they demonstrate that law is fluid, ephemeral, and
ever-changing.
This does not mean, however, that the unbridled use of humor
and sarcasm is always appropriate. It can have harmful effects, espe-
cially when directed at a litigant. Thus, judges, because of their posi-
tion, must accept certain constraints upon their freedom of
expression, 39 and must be able to determine when the use of humor or
imagery is proper.
37. Donelon v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 474 F.2d 1108, 1114 (5th Cir. 1973).
38. See generally F. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE (1980).
39. In re Bonn, 375 Mass. 680, 709, 378 N.E.2d 669, 684 (1978); Matter of Seraphim, 97
Wis. 2d 485, 500, 294 N.W.2d 485, 494 (1980). One commentator has suggested that in-court
speech by judges be subject to greater restraint than out-of-court speech when proceedings are
pending. See Gross, Judicial Speech: Discipline and the First Amendment, 36 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1181 (1986). For other views on judges' out-of-court speech, see Lubet, Judicial Ethics
and Private Lives, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 983 (1984-85); Reavley, Free Speech for Judges, 9
LITIGATION 5 (1982).
Obviously not feeling restrained, some judges have compiled and published selected
humorous and figurative opinions. See, e.g., M. JONES, SHOULD UNCLE SAM PAY-WHEN
AND WHY? (1958); M. MUSMANNO, THAT'S MY OPINION (1966). Others, like United States
1987]
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Possible abuse, however, should not preclude the proper use of
figurative language, for there exist mechanisms to deal with improper
judicial conduct. An illustrative example is In re Inquiry Relating to
Rome." In that case, a Kansas state court trial judge placed a prosti-
tute on probation for soliciting an undercover policeman. He then
filed a memorandum written in verse:
This is the saga of -
Whose ancient profession brings her before us.
On January 30th, 1974
This lass agreed to work as a whore
Her great mistake, as was to unfold
was the enticing of a cop named Harold.
Unknown to -, this officer, surnamed Harris,
was duty bent on -'s lot to embarrass.
Trial was set in this higher Court,
But the route of appeal - chose to abort
And back to Judge Rome, came this lady of the night,
To plead for her freedom and end this great fight.
So under advisement -'s freedom was taken,
and in the bastille this lady did waken.
The judge showed mercy and was free,
But back to the street she could not flee.
The fine she'd pay while out on parole,
But not from men she used to cajole.
From her ancient profession she'd been busted,
And to society's rule she must be adjusted.
If from all of this a moral doth unfurl,
It is that Pimps do not protect the working girl.4'
The memorandum was widely quoted in local papers, and eventually
the state commission on judicial qualifications brought a proceeding
against the judge. The Supreme Court of Kansas concluded that the
memorandum portrayed the defendant in a "ludicrous or comical sit-
uation-someone to be laughed at and her plight found amusing."42
The court held that the code of judicial conduct circumscribed Judge
Rome's free speech rights, and censured him for having held the
defendant up to public ridicule or scorn.43 The court pointed out,
Circuit Judge Frank Coffin, have published light-hearted books about advocacy. See F.
COFFIN, A LEXICON OF ORAL ADVOCACY (1984).
40. 218 Kan. 198, 542 P.2d 676 (1975).
41. Id. at 200-01, 542 P.2d at 680-81.
42. Id. at 208, 542 P.2d at 685.
43. Id. at 205-06, 208, 542 P.2d at 684, 686. In 1981, the Supreme Court of Kansas
removed Judge Rome from office because he had allowed his feelings about a vote on how
[Vol. 41:693
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however, that Judge Rome was "not being subjected to disciplinary
proceedings because he wrote and filed a memorandum in poetic form
but because of the particular manner in which it was written.""
Rome demonstrates that there are ways to discipline judges who
abuse their position and freedom of expression.
Judges must always remember that lawsuits and cases are serious
matters for those involved, and should be careful not to demean liti-
gants or lawyers in their opinions. It does not necessarily follow, how-
ever, that judicial opinions must be lifeless and dull. Judges are called
upon to draw lines and make difficult decisions every day; if they wish
to use figurative language, they can surely be entrusted to determine if
and when the use of humor or imagery is proper. If they go over the
line, they can be disciplined.
III. THE COURT JESTERS
Humor and imagery have had a long, if uncomfortable, relation-
ship with law. Much of the discomfort is attributable to the frequent
use of humor by outsiders to lampoon the legal system. Political com-
mentators and satirists traditionally have taken aim at legal institu-
tions. For instance, Honore Daumier, the 19th century French
illustrator, ridiculed his country's legal system in a well-known series
of lithographs.4" The use of humor by insiders, however, is by no
means something new. English judges used figurative language to
judges should be selected to affect his treatment of certain lawyers. See Commission on
Judicial Qualifications v. Rome, 229 Kan. 195, 623 P.2d 1307 (1981).
44. Rome, 218 Kan. at 206, 542 P.2d at 684. The line between disparaging remarks and
proper criticism is a fuzzy one. Consider millionaire Victor Posner's recent trial on tax evasion
charges. After a jury found Posner guilty, newspaper reports and juror interviews revealed
that the jury had considered extrinsic materials during its deliberations. Judge Eugene
Spellman found that Posner had been denied a fair trial, and granted his motion for a new trial.
In his opinion, Judge Spellman chastised one of the jurors for his misconduct in language that
was both humorous and critical:
Up until a few months ago, only one other individual with the last name Bach
earned a place in history for his contribution to the world. Added to this list now
is Roger Bach, who through this case emerges as a new figure rivaling the
accomplishments of even the great composer of the Brandenburg Concertos. ...
[Mr. Bach] put on a clinic of some of the most interesting and harmful abuses of
the jury system that any one juror could hope to achieve in a single trial.
United States v. Posner, 644 F. Supp. 885, 888 n.7 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
45. Daumier's legal prints are collected in Lawyers and Justice, published by Leon Amiel
Publishers. Today, editorial cartoonists criticize crooked lawyers, ridicule controversial legal
decisions, and poke fun at both the judiciary and the legal system. This cartoon by Pat
Oliphant, which appeared in 1984, compared the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Warren
Burger to the Spanish Inquisition.
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adorn their opinions as far back as the 18th century,46 and books on
law, literature and humor began appearing fairly frequently in the
United States in the late 1800's.
47
The largest American legal publisher highlighted the lighter side
of law in the early 20th century by publishing West Publishing Co. 's
Docket, a legal periodical devoted to "instructive and entertaining
comments and discussions on matters of interest to the legal profes-
sion."48 Since then, books on legal humor and literature have become
more common. R.E. Megarry's Miscellany-at-Law49 is a scholarly
compilation of legal anecdotes, and The Legal Spectator,"° by Jacob
-~ ...... TT,  'l Tlot
"OK, Burger Court, second Reagan term - all hold for the camera, please..."
Copyright 1984, Universal Press Syndicate. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
Critical commentary on the legal system has also taken other forms. In a recent article,
Jennifer Jaff examined the way pop musicians portray lawyers. See Jaff, Law and Lawyer in
Pop Music.- A Reason for Self-Reflection, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 659 (1986).
46. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., L. BIGELoW, BENCH AND BAR: A COMPLETE DIGEST OF THE WIT,
HUMOR, ASPERITIES, AND AMENITIES OF THE LAW (1871) (collection of anecdotes,
miscellaneous legal epigrams, puns and poems); I. BROWNE, LAW AND LAWYERS IN
LITERATURE (1883) (depiction of law in literature and drama). In one of his best sections,
Browne reproduces a burlesque of the trial scene in Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice
written in the form of a pretended judicial opinion. Id. at 30-39.
48. WE:sr PUBISHING Co.'s DOCKET, March-April 1927, at introduction. The West
periodical-not to be confused with The Docket, the newsletter of the National Institute for
Trial Advocacy-had sections devoted to legal humor, law, and literature.
49. R.E. MIGARRY, MISCIEI.LANY-ATr-LAW (1955).
50. J. STE.IN, THE LEGAl. SPECTATOR (1976). In An Odd Report, Stein tells about an
incredibly lucid volume of the federal reporter he had once found. The volume, which turned
JUDICIAL IMAGERY AND HUMOR
Stein, is, in the author's words, a collection of "transient essays"
about the law memorialized in book form. In a recent essay, Edward
Bander, law librarian at Suffolk University Law School, surveys books
on legal humor and places legal humor in perspective.5'
Apparently sensing that creative writing is no longer taboo, some
judges have turned to humor and imagery in their opinions.52 What
follows is a small sampling of some of the best judicial opinions
employing colorful language.
A. Imagery in the High Court
The United States Supreme Court is the most visible judicial
body in the country. As a result, the decisions it hands down are
scrutinized more closely than are the decisions of other courts. This,
however, has not deterred Supreme Court Justices from writing cre-
atively. Although some of the most memorable passages in Supreme
Court cases have been penned in majority opinions, imagery and
humor have surfaced more in concurrences and dissents, perhaps
because such opinions tend to undercut the majority's position.
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,53 the
Court held that the tenth amendment did not bar Congress from
applying minimum-wage laws to state and local governments. Justice
O'Connor dissented, likening the disagreement over the interpretation
of the tenth amendment to a battle:
The Court today surveys the battle scene of federalism and
sounds a retreat. Like Justice POWELL, I would prefer to hold
the field and, at the very least, render a little aid to the wounded. I
join Justice POWELL's opinion. I also write separately to note my
fundamental disagreement with the majority's views of federalism
and the duty of this Court.54
The comparison of legal argument to war had appeared before Garcia.
Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist, concurring in Northern Pipe-
line Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.," used figurative language to
out to be counterfeit, "was filled with spurious cases deciding issues that needed deciding but
were as yet unreached by judicial illumination." Id. at 161-62.
51. See Bander, A Survey of Legal Humor Books, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1065 (1985).
52. This has naturally generated some commentary about judges with unique or humorous
literary styles. See, e.g., Domnarski, The Tale of the Text: The Figurative Prose Style of
Connecticut Supreme Court Justice Leo Parksey, 18 CONN. L. REV. 459 (1986); Hale, John S.
Wilkes. Judicial Humorist, 23 TENN. L. REV. 255 (1954).
53. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The Court overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), a case it had decided only nine years earlier.
54. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
55. 458 U.S. 50 (1981) (holding jurisdictional aspects of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978
unconstitutional under article III of the Constitution).
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describe Justice White's view of Congress' authority under article III
of the Constitution: "I need not decide whether [the Court's article
III cases] support a general proposition and three tidy exceptions, as
the plurality believes, or whether instead they are but landmarks on a
judicial 'darkling plain' where ignorant armies have clashed by night,
as Justice WHITE apparently believes them to be."
'5 6
In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization," the
Court held that low-income individuals and organizations represent-
ing them did not have standing to contest an Internal Revenue Service
ruling which granted favorable tax treatment to hospitals despite their
refusal to treat indigents to the extent of the hospitals' financial abil-
ity. Justice Powell's opinion for the Court distinguished United States
v. SCRAP,58 a case in which the Court had granted standing to a
group of students who alleged that action by the Interstate Commerce
Commission caused them aesthetic and environmental harm. Justice
Brennan, dissenting, used a pun to criticize the majority opinion:
"Certainly the Court's attempted distinction of SCRAP will not
'wash.' "9 In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,6" the Court held that the
Federal Communications Commission had the power to regulate
indecent broadcasting. Justice Stevens, who authored the plurality
opinion, ended with an observation that made the plurality's holding
clear:
As Mr. Sutherland wrote, a "nuisance may be merely a right thing
in the wrong place-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barn-
yard." We simply hold that when the Commission finds that a pig
has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not
depend on proof that the pig is obscene.6 '
56. Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The metaphor is Matthew Arnold's. See M.
ARNOLD, DOVER BEACH, Stanza IV (1867) ("Ah, love, let us be true to one another! For the
world, which seems. . . So various, so beautiful, so new, hath really neither joy, nor love, nor
light. . . . And we are here as on a darkling plain swept with confused alarms of struggle and
flight, where ignorant armies clash by night.").
Apparently Chief Justice Rehnquist's penchant for wit extends to oral argument. In a
recent case addressing the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute requiring the teaching of
"creation-science" whenever the theory of evolution is taught in public schools, the plaintiffs'
attorney suggested that the state's definition of creationism was an attempt to fool the Court,
like Tweedledum tried to fool Alice in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass. The
attorney predicted that the Court would not be so easily fooled. Chief Justice Rehnquist
responded, "Don't overestimate us." Summary of Oral Argument in Edwards v. Aguillard, 55
U.S.L.W. 3420 (U.S., Dec. 16, 1986) (No. 85-1513).
57. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
58. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
59. Simon, 426 U.S. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The case involved the radio broadcast of comedian George
Carlin's satiric monologue, "Filthy Words."
61. Id. at 750-51 (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)).
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On occasion, Justices have used mellow humor to poke fun at
themselves. Justice Robert Jackson, who is said to rival Holmes and
Cardozo as a great legal writer,62 once found himself in a slight pre-
dicament. In McGrath v. Kristensen,63 the Court held that a tempo-
rary visitor to the United States, whose visit had been unavoidably
prolonged by the outbreak of World War II, was not precluded from
becoming naturalized under prevailing statutes and regulations sim-
ply because he had refused to perform military duty. Justice Jackson
agreed with the majority. Before joining the Court, however, Jack-
son, as Attorney General, had given contrary advice to Secretary of
War Stimson, and the Attorney General who argued for the govern-
ment in Kristensen relied on Jackson's earlier opinion. The "circum-
stance apparently provoked Jackson to add the following [statement]
to the opinion of the Court:" 64
I concur in the judgment and opinion of the Court. But since
it is contrary to an opinion which, as Attorney General, I rendered
in 1940, I owe some word of explanation. 39 Ops Atty Gen 504. I
am entitled to say of that opinion what any discriminating reader
must think of it-that it was as foggy as the statute the Attorney
General was asked to interpret. It left the difficult borderline ques-
tions posed by the Secretary of War unanswered, covering its lack
of precision with generalities....
Precedent, however, is not lacking for ways by which a judge
may recede from a prior opinion that has proven untenable and
perhaps misled others. See Chief Justice Taney, License Cases, 5
How 504, 12, recanting views he had pressed upon the Court as
Attorney General of Maryland in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat
419. Baron Bramwell extricated himself from a somewhat similar
embarrassment by saying, "The matter does not appear to me now
as it appears to have appeared to me then." Andrews v. Styrap, 26
L.T.R. (NS) 704, 706. And Mr. Justice Story, accounting for his
contradiction of his own former opinion, quite properly put the
matter: "My own error, however, can furnish no ground for its
being adopted by this Court ...... United States v. Gooding, 12
Wheat 460, 478. Perhaps Dr. Johnson really went to the heart of
the matter when he explained a blunder in his dictionary-"Igno-
rance, sir, ignorance." But an escape less self-depreciating was
taken by Lord Westbury, who, it is said, rebuffed a barrister's reli-
ance upon an earlier opinion of his Lordship: "I can only say that
62. G. SCHUBERT, DISPASSIONATE JUSTICE 7 (1969). For examples of Justice Jackson's
artistry, see his opinion for the Court in the flag salute case, West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943), and his dissent in the Japanese internment case, Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944).
63. 340 U.S. 162 (1950).
64. G. SCHUBERT, supra note 62, at 312-13.
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I am amazed that a man of my intelligence should have been guilty
of giving such an opinion." If there are other ways of gracefully
and good naturedly surrendering former views to a better consid-
ered position, I invoke them all.65
Other literary devices have also found their way into Supreme
Court opinions. In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 6 6 the
Court held that an Arizona statute requiring a year's residence in a
county as a condition to an indigent's receiving nonemergency hospi-
talization or medical care at the county's expense violated the equal
protection clause. Justice Douglas, concurring, appended a fable to
his opinion. The fable, which had been written as a foreword to an
article on medical care, told the story of Gourmand, a country whose
people loved good food. The country required all its chefs to "com-
plete at least twenty one years of training," and as a result the price of
food skyrocketed. Eating clubs were organized, and people began to
frequent specialty restaurants. Soon there were not enough chefs to
keep the small restaurants open, and prices continued to rise. A gov-
ernment commission was created to study the culinary problems fac-
ing the country:
The commission agreed that weighty problems faced the
nation. They recommended that a national prepayment group be
established which everyone must join. They recommended that
chefs continue to be paid on the basis of the number of dishes they
prepared. They recommended that every Gourmandese be given
the right to eat anywhere he chose and as elaborately as he chose
and pay nothing.
These recommendations were adopted. Large numbers of
people spent all of their time ordering incredibly elaborate meals.
Kitchens became marvels of new, expensive equipment. All those
who were not consuming restaurant food were in the kitchen pre-
paring it. Since no one in Gourmand did anything except prepare
or eat meals, the country collapsed.6 7
65. Kristensen, 340 U.S. at 176-78 (Jackson, J., concurring).
66. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
67. Id. at 274-76 (Douglas, J., concurring). Apparently, Justice Douglas' penchant for the
out-of-the ordinary was contagious. Federal District Judge Jerry Buchmeyer, writing in the
Texas Bar Journal, tells about a fictitious opinion authored by one of Justice Douglas' clerks in
1963. The "case," Young v. Magnolia, involved "racial discrimination, prayer in public
schools, price fixing, police brutality, equal rights for women, rate-making, innkeepers, grist
millers, and public utilities." The "opinion" began subtly: "We put to one side a number of
the cases relied upon by the City. The opinions in these cases were written by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter. With the way thus cleared the violation of the equal protection clause in this case
is doubly apparent." The "opinion," which goes on to "hold" that a brothel is a public utility
required to serve all who can pay, and Judge Buchmeyer's humorous commentary on it,
cannot be adequately paraphrased in a footnote. For the complete story, see Buchmeyer, A
Matter of Opinion .... TEX. B.J., Nov. 1981, at 1285-86.
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B. The Prose of Irving Goldberg
Judge Irving Goldberg was appointed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 1966.68 Since then, his colorful
opinions have been a welcome change of pace for law students and
lawyers alike. As evidenced by the excerpts that follow, Judge
Goldberg's writing style defies classification. He seems to feel as com-
fortable with literary allusions as he does with sports analogies.69
The names of litigants, those involved in lawsuits, and the subject
matter of cases themselves have often provided Judge Goldberg with
the ammunition he has needed. In a case involving Kentucky Fried
Chicken, Judge Goldberg penned the following lines: "This case
presents us with something mundane, something novel, and some-
thing bizarre .... [T]he bizarre element is the facially implausible-
some might say unappetizing-contention that the man whose
chicken is 'finger-lickin' good' has unclean hands."7 Dissenting in a
diversity case, he used the facts involved in Erie71 to argue that the
court should have certified a question of "enterprise" liability to the
Supreme Court of Louisiana:
As the majority opinion clickety-clacks down the Erie tracks,
I fear I hear the sound of the cross-ties splintering. Were I the
switchman I would sidetrack this case to the Louisiana switching
yards where a locomotive of sufficient power to pull the freight of
the majority opinion might be attached. As it is, I remain alone in
68. Judge Goldberg was one of seven judges appointed to the Fifth Circuit that year. The
circumstances that led to those appointments are detailed in J. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 304-
05 (1981). Since his appointment, Judge Goldberg has been an activist sensitive to civil
liberties issues.
69. It is apparent that Judge Goldberg loves to write. See United States v. Taylor, 448
F.2d 349, 354 (5th Cir. 1971) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("my
proclivity for verbosity, perhaps, impels me to add the following thoughts"). For his
comparison of court-appointed attorneys to designated hitters, see infra notes 73 & 74 and
accompanying text. Another Goldberg opinion alluding to sports is Johnson v. Estelle, 506
F.2d 347, 352 (5th Cir. 1975): "There are only four quarters to a football game .... The
State's argument in the present case would nullify the doctrine of double jeopardy because any
slight deviation in the indictment would give the State another Monday morning quarter."
70. Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Diversified Packaging Corp, 549 F.2d 368, 372 (5th Cir.
1977). Kentucky Fried Chicken is not the only case in which Judge Goldberg has used a
famous personality to color an opinion. See Peerless Ins. Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 791
F.2d 1177, 1178 (5th Cir. 1986) ("This diversity case involves the question whether § 3-419 of
the Uniform Commercial Code displaced the common law action for money had and received
under Texas law. It arises, one could say, from Vincent J. Menier's desire for more cream in
his coffee. While Joe DiMaggio confidently extolled the virtues of 'Mr. Coffee' coffee makers,
which are manufactured by appellant North American Systems, Inc., Menier, the Vice
President of North American's Fairfield Filter Division, pilfered and filched checks through
the financial filter of forged endorsements.").
71. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that federal courts in diversity
cases must generally apply state substantive law).
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the caboose, dissenting. 72
Confronted by a defendant's allegation that he should have been
allowed to represent himself, Judge Goldberg offered this introduc-
tion in Chapman v. United States:73 "Don Garriga Chapman, for
whom designated hitters have struck out in four at-bats before district
courts and four previous trips to the plate before this court, protests
that the trial court erred by refusing to let him pinch-hit for himself
while his court appointed attorney was still in the on-deck circle."
74
In United States v. Beechum,75 the Fifth Circuit overruled United
States v. Broadway76 and held that evidence of an extrinsic offense
could be admitted to prove a defendant's intent because its probative
value outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. Judge Goldberg dis-
sented: "As the lights are being extinguished on Broadway, I feel
impelled to light a few candles in requiem .... I can only hope that
the majority will soon see the error of its ways and return to the Great
White Way of Broadway with the appreciation and respect that the
grand old boulevard deserves."
77
Poetry 7 as well as literary, musical, and biblical allusions are
common in Judge Goldberg's opinions. In United States v. Batson,79
his opinion for the court began:
Some farmers from Gaines had a plan.
It amounted to quite a big scam.
But the payments for cotton
began to smell rotten.
Twas a mugging of poor Uncle Sam.
The ASCS and its crew
uncovered this fraudulent stew.
After quite a few hearings,
the end is now nearing-
72. Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1983) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting). A legal newspaper selected Judge Goldberg's words as the quote of the week. See
Legal Times, Sept. 26, 1983, at 6, col. 2-3.
73. 553 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977).
74. Id. at 887-88.
75. 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
76. 477 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1973).
77. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 918, 927 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Judge Goldberg's dissents
are sometimes dramatic. See, e.g., United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 1973)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("I dissent. I refuse to join my brothers as a pallbearer at the funeral
of the Fourth Amendment in this Circuit .... I find, rather disconcertingly, that my funeral
dirge is a solo.").
78. With apologies to any poets who might read this article, it should be clear that the
poetry of judicial opinions includes (perhaps features) parodies, limericks and doggerel verse.
I shall uncritically call it poetry nonetheless, whether it be high-, middle-, low-, or no-brow
verse.
79. 782 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1986).
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It awaits our judicial review."0
The opinion in a publishing contract case began with a restatement of
Genesis:
In the beginning, Zim created the concept of the Golden
Guides. For the earth was dark and ignorance filled the void. And
Zim said, let there be enlightenment and there was enlighten-
ment .... And Zim saw that it was very good.
Then there rose up in Western a new Vice-President who
knew not Zim. And there was strife and discord, anger and frus-
tration .... Verily, they came with their counselors of law into the
district court for judgment and sued there upon their covenants.
[A]nd the district judge heard Zim's cry, but gave judgment
for Western. Yea, the district judge gave judgment to Western on
a counterclaim as well.8
A famous passage from Ecclesiastes provided the opening lines in a
tax deduction case:
"To everything there is a season, and a time to every purpose
under the heaven: A time to be born, and a time to die; a time to
plant, and a time to pluck up that which is planted;" a time to
purchase fertilizer, and a time to take a deduction for that which is
purchased. In this appeal from a Tax Court decision, we are asked
to determine when the time for taking a fertilizer deduction should
be.
8 2
In Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville Railroad Co.,83 the plaintiff
alleged that he had been the victim of age discrimination. Judge
Goldberg quoted a poem by Robert Browning to put the case in
perspective:
Grow old along with me!
The best is yet to be,
The last of life, for which
the first was made.
-Robert Browning,
Rabbi Ben Ezra st. 1
(1864)
For many elder Americans, Browning's verse is a cruel jest rather
80. Id. at 1309.
81. Zim v. Western Publishing Co., 573 F.2d 1318, 1321 (5th Cir. 1978).
82. Schenk v. C.I.R., 686 F.2d 315, 316 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Ecclesiastes 3:1-2). Judge
Goldberg has made some interesting observations on the nature of the American tax system.
See U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. of Dallas v. Harbison, 784 F.2d 1238, 1239 (5th Cir. 1986)
(Goldberg, J.); see also Pacific Coast Music Jobbers, Inc. v. C.I.R., 457 F.2d 1165, 1166 (5th
Cir. 1972) (Goldberg, J.) ("A taxpayer cannot simply enter a telephone booth and change into
his Subchapter S suit.").
83. 760 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1985).
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than a reassuring vision. Not only must they face the inexorable
advance of nature-they must face the biases of their fellow man.
84
Determining congressional intent frequently has proven to be a
difficult task for judges. Judge Goldberg used the theme to introduce
two opinions. In United States v. Baker,85 the Fifth Circuit had to
determine whether the defendants must have known of federal
involvement to be convicted of making false statements within the
jurisdiction of a government department or agency:
We are faced today with a lacuna in the midst of a somewhat
dense federal law. The statutory language provides little guidance,
and we have no helpful legislative history to aid us in filling the
gap. Our task, then, is to read the collective mind of the 1948
Congress. Without a (very large) psychiatrist's couch, this task is
difficult indeed.86
In Briggs v. American Air Filter Co.,87 the court had to interpret an
ambiguous federal criminal statute:
We might wish we had planted a powerful electronic bug in a
Congressional antechamber. to garner every clue concerning Title
III, for we are once again faced with the troublesome task of an
interstitial interpretation of an amorphous Congressional enact-
ment. Even a clear bright beam of statutory language can be
obscured by the mirror of Congressional intent. Here, we must
divine the will of Congress when all recorded signs point to less
than full reflection. But, alas, we lack any sophisticated sensor of
Congressional whispers, and are remitted to our more primitive
tools. With them, we can only hope to measure Congress' general
clime. So we engage our wind vane and barometer and seek to
measure the direction of the Congressional vapors and the pres-
sures fomenting them. Our search for lightning bolts of compre-
hension traverses a fog of inclusions and exclusions which obscures
both the parties' burdens and the ultimate goal.
88
Like literature and religion, humor is an important part of Judge
Goldberg's repertoire. In a case involving title of property and a fire
insurance policy, he used the subject-matter of the suit to have a little
fun with metaphors:
We, the appellate firemen, must respond to all calls and have
approached the question of title with caution, combing both the
record of the proceedings below and the mortgage laws of Texas
for a hidden spark. Finding appellant Allstate's pleas for help to
84. Id. at 637.
85. 626 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1980).
86. Id. at 513.
87. 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980).
88. Id. at 415.
[Vol. 41:693
JUDICIAL IMAGERY AND HUMOR
be nothing more than a false alarm, we affirm the judgment below
awarding recovery under the policy.8 9
In Golden Panagia S.S., Inc. v. Panama Canal Commission,9° the
attorney for a ship owner whose ship had been damaged in a collision
in the Panama Canal absconded with settlement proceeds, and the
shipowner brought two actions to reopen the settled case and replace
the stolen settlement check. Judge Goldberg dropped a footnote,
commenting on the fact that the shipowner had not sued its attorney:
Consistent with its theory that there was no valid settlement,
and that the stolen funds still belonged to the Government, Golden
Panagia has declined to bring suit against Newell. Counsel for
Golden Panagia informed this court at oral argument that Newell
is now, in any event, dead. A Higher Court thus has jurisdiction
over Henry Newell, and we are confident that any sins he may
have committed will be dealt with appropriately there. See Mat-
thew 25:41-46 (explaining Final Judgment procedures).91
The issue in Oil & Gas Futures, Inc. of Texas v. Andrus9 2 was whether
the Secretary of the Interior had erred in construing a bid of .82165
for an offshore gas lease as a bid of 82.165%. Judge Goldberg framed
it this way: "In this appeal we are asked to determine whether '.82' is
the equivalent of '82%.' Having successfully completed grammar
school, we are able to answer in the affirmative."93
Judge Goldberg has also used humorous headings to add color to
his opinions. In a case involving arbitration between a union and
management, he used mythology to illustrate the "Olympian level" of
the arbitration process. The headings read: "The Trojan War: Fac-
tual Background," "Scylla and Charybdis," "Setting Our Course:
The Odyssey to Preserve Arbitration," and "The Cyclops: The Leg-
end of Honeywell."94 Popular songs were the focus of the headings in
City of Marshall, Texas v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., a case
involving allegations of deceptive trade practices in the sale of air con-
ditioning units: "Summer in the City," "'We Can Work It Out': The
89. Reynolds v. Allstate Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 1111, 1112 (5th Cir. 1980). Judge Goldberg
also "sermonized" the headings, which read "From Bark to Ash," "The Burnt Offering,"
"The Commandment," and "The Sacrifice Remanded."
90. 791 F.2d 1191 (5th Cir. 1986).
91. Id. at 1199 n.2. The opinion also contained a classic Goldberg opening: "It is
sometimes said that 'two ships passing in the night' is a bad thing. This case proves that the
opposite result-two ships colliding in broad daylight-may not always be desirable either."
Id. at 1192.
92. 610 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1980).
93. Id.
94. Oil, Chemical & Atomic, Etc. v. Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d 1044, 1046, 1048-49, 1053 (5th
Cir. Unit A May 1981).
95. 650 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).
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Deceptive Trade Practices Act Claim," " 'Promises, Promises': The
Breach of Warranty Issues," and "Conclusion: 'The Second Time
Around'. ... 96 In United States v. Grissom,97 the defendant was
charged with disposing of soybean crops with intent to defraud the
mortgagee, the Farmers Home Administration. Each heading in
Judge Goldberg's opinion told a story: "All in the Family: Back-
ground Facts," "Joe and the Beanstalk: Grissom's Story," "Grissom
Gets Beaned: The District Court's Jury Instructions," and "Making a
Federal Mountain Out of a Bean Hill."
98
It is probably appropriate to end this section on Judge Goldberg
with one of his best efforts, Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co. 99 In Miley,
an investor sued a broker and two of its registered representatives to
recover for "churning," or excessive trading of securities of his
account. After a descriptive opening,"° Judge Goldberg milked the
headings for all they were worth. They read: "The Ingredients of a
Churning Case: Skimmed Versus Evaporated Milk," "Compensating
Damages: Crying Over Spilt Milk," "Punitive Damages for Soured
Milk: The High Cost of Churning," "The Court's Charge: A Tasty
Dairy Recipe," "Refusal to Order Arbitration: Preserving the
Homogenized Milk," and "Conclusion: Grade A Pasteurized and
Homogenized."' 0'1
Judge Goldberg's opinions illustrate why humorous and figura-
tive language is a desirable and healthy addition to American juris-
prudence. Goldberg definitely captures the lighter side of law and the
human experiences it addresses. Fortunately, he is not the only jurist
who frequently uses figurative language.
C. John Brown's Headings
Humor and imagery seem to thrive in the Fifth Circuit. One of
96. Id. at 725, 727-28. For another Goldberg musical interlude, see Ferguson v. National
Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1978).
97. 645 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981).
98. Id. at 462-64.
99. 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981).
100. Despite the fact that judges have been composing churning law for over a
decade among the outdoor vendors and the pigeons that line Foley Square (the
seat of the Second Circuit) and over the rumbling of nearby cable cars in San
Francisco (the base of the Ninth Circuit), the Fifth Circuit's only churning
composition has been a deafening silence, rivaling the notorious work of John
Cage.
Id. at 323 (citing John Cage, Four Minutes and Thirty-Three Seconds (a piano composition
dedicated to the proposition that silence is music to the ears)).
101. Id. at 324, 326, 329, 332, 334, 337. For other Goldberg opinions with headings
employing imagery, see Chaline v. Kcoh, Inc., 693 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1982) (acts of a play);
Lemon v. Bank Lines, Ltd., 656 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. Sept. 1981) (ship in a storm).
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Judge Goldberg's fellow judges, John Brown, shares his affinity for
creative writing. Although Judge Brown's style is different, his opin-
ions remind us that humor is as much a part of law as it is of everyday
life. Judge Brown has had a long and distinguished career as a circuit
judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.1
0 2
During the late 1950's and early 1960's, he, along with fellow circuit
judges Richard Rives, Elbert Tuttle, and John Minor Wisdom, helped
desegregate the South °3 by enforcing Brown v. Board of Education."o
The color with which Judge Brown sometimes dresses'0 5 often
shows up in his opinions. As Jack Bass has noted, "[iun later years,
Brown spiced his opinions with quotable, colorful phrases-the
'Browning' of them, his [past] clerks called it.' 10 6 Most of Judge
Brown's humor and imagery show up in the headings and subhead-
ings of his opinions, which have made him "something of a leg-
end."'0 7 Although some of the headings do not contribute to an
understanding of the cases, and may be written just for fun, they are
nevertheless precisely that, fun to read.
In Jackson v. Chevron Chemical Co.,108 a cotton farmer sued an
insecticide manufacturer for crop losses allegedly caused by ineffec-
tive treatment with the manufacturer's products. Judge Brown's
headings were filled with puns: "Getting the Bugs Out" and "See,
Hear and Speak No Weevil.' 0 9 Products Carnie, S.A. v. Central
American Beef and Seafood Trading Co. 11 involved a lawsuit brought
by a bankrupt to recover some 862,000 pounds of frozen boneless
beef, or its value, from the corporation to which the beef had been
shipped. Judge Brown's headings toyed with the subject matter of the
suit: "No Bones About It," "Appellant's Beef," and "What's at
102. Judge Brown was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in 1955. He served as Chief Judge of the circuit from 1967 through 1969.
103. See J. BASS, supra note 68.
104. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that state laws authorizing segregation of white and black
children in the public schools solely on the basis of race violated the fourteenth amendment's
guarantee of equal protection of the laws).
105. During a 1979 interview at his office, Brown was clad in red trousers, a peach-
colored shirt, black tie with a silk screen print of a New Orleans wrought iron
design, and soft leather low-cut black boots-a sartorial style that contrasted
with the conservative attire and attitude he displayed toward dress during his
early years on the bench.
J. BASS, supra note 68, at 105.
106. Id.
107. John Brown's Bawdy, Legal Times, July 26, 1982, at 3, col. 3.
108. 679 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1982).
109. Id. at 464-65. Jackson is not the only case in which Judge Brown has dealt with crop-
destroying weevils. See T.J. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 511 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1975).
110. 621 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Steak.""' In Woolen v. Surtan Taxicabs, Inc., 2 a class action
brought by a taxi company to challenge an airport's restriction of tax-
icab passengers to limited holders of permits, a group of cab drivers
sought to intervene. Using both the nature of the plaintiffs' business
and the legal issue before the court, Judge Brown came up with some
dandy headings: "A Touch of Class," "Trying to Get to the Head of
the Class," "United We Fall, Divided We Stand," "Tax(i)ation With-
out Representation," "Let's All Join In," and "Keep the Meter
Running."''I 3
Names, products, music, and games have also surfaced in Judge
Brown's headings. In a counterfeiting case, Judge Brown entitled one
section of his opinion "Pennies from Heaven-Dollars from
Xerox."' 4 In United States v. Anderton," 5 the defendant challenged
the admissibility of certain taped conversations between himself and a
government agent. The section of the opinion addressing that issue
was entitled "Is It Alive or Is It Memorex?"'" 6 A popular video
game, Pac-Man, was the common thread of Judge Brown's opinion in
TTT Stevedores of Texas, Inc. v. M/V Jagat Vijeta, 11 7 where steve-
dores sought to recover unpaid stevedoring charges incurred during
the loading of a vessel. The headings in that case included "TTT
Stevedores' Appeal: Pack-Men Piqued," "Full Recovery of Addi-
tional Loading Charges: Pack-Men's Profit Apportioned," and
"Wrongful Seizure: Are Pack-Men Space Invaders?""' 8 Using the
name of one of the parties in ECEE, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission," 9 Judge Brown came up with two innovative headings
that read like a cliche: "Ecee Come . . ., " "Ecee Go." In Whittington
v. Estelle, 2 ' he structured the opinion with musical allusions, using
headings like "The Overture: Con Brio," "The Trial: Sour Notes and
All that Jazz," and "Appellate Prelude."' 2'
Like Judge Goldberg's prose, Judge Brown's opinions have their
own unique and creative flavor. Although humorous headings domi-
111. Id. at 685-86. For a "fish story" in a similar vein, see Wells Fargo Bus. Credit v. Ben
Kozloff, Inc., 695 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Fish Story," "The One that Got Away," "Gone
Fishin' "). See also Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 347 Mass. 421, 198 N.E.2d 309
(1964) (history of fish chowder).
112. 684 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1982).
113. Id. at 326-28, 330, 334.
114. United States v. Lemaire, 712 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1983).
115. 679 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1982).
116. Id. at 1202.
117. 696 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1983).
118. Id. at 1138, 1140-41.
119. 611 F.2d 554, 556, 559 (5th Cir. 1980).
120. 704 F.2d 1418 (5th Cir. 1983).
121. Id. at 1419-21.
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nate his work, he sometimes plays with the text of opinions. One of
his "famous '  cases is Croft & Scully Co. v. M/V Skulptor Vuche-
tich, 123 which involved liability for damaged cases of soft drinks. Sev-
eral excerpts from the opinion speak for themselves:
Croft & Scully contracted to ship 1755 case of soft drinks
from Houston, Texas to the middle eastern country of Kuwait.
Apparently Kuwaits [sic] would like to be Peppers, too....
As one of the Stevedore's employees was lifting the container,
with the use of a forklift, he negligently dropped it. By our calcu-
lations, 42,120 cans of soft drinks crashed to the ground, never a
thirst to quench. In the Crush, the cans were damaged. The steve-
dore, no doubt, was in no mood to have a Coke and a smile.124
Judge Brown had used the names of products for puns before Croft &
Scully. In Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Association v. Clark,'25
the Fifth Circuit held that a Dade County, Florida ordinance requir-
ing certain labels on detergents was preempted by federal law. Judge
Brown's concurrence tracked the majority holding by using the names
of detergents:
As soap, now displaced by latter day detergents, is the grist of
Madison Avenue, I add these few comments in the style of that
street to indicate my full agreement with the opinion of the Court
and to keep the legal waters clear and phosphate-free .... Clearly,
the decision represents a Gamble since we risk a Cascade of criti-
cism from an increasing Tide of ecology-minded citizens. Yet, a
contrary decision would most likely have precipitated a Niagara of
complaints from an industry which justifiably seeks uniformity in
the laws with which it must comply. Inspired by the legendary
valor of Ajax, who withstood Hector's lance, we have Boldly cho-
sen the course of uniformity in reversing the lower Court's decision
upholding Dade County's local labeling laws. And, having done
so, we are Cheered by the thought that striking down the regula-
tion by the local jurisdiction does not create a void which is detri-
mental to consumers, but rather merely acknowledges that federal
legislation has preempted this field with adequate labeling rules.' 26
In United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc.,127 Judge Brown composed a
verse' 28 to introduce the case:
122. Some would say infamous.
123. 664 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1982).
124. Id. at 1278-79. The opinion also contains a typical Brown heading-"Pepsi Cola Hits
the Spot-On the Pavement." Id. at 1279.
125. 482 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1973).
126. Id. at 328. "Brown reportedly sent a clerk to a supermarket to copy [the] names of
every detergent product on the shelves." J. BASS, supra note 68, at 105.
127. 602 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1979).
128. See supra note 76.
1987]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
This case presents a vicious duel,
Between the U.S. of A. and defendant Ven-Fuel.
Seeking a license for oil importation,
Ven-Fuel submitted its application.
It failed to attach a relevant letter,
And none can deny, it should have known better.
Yet the only issue this case is about,
Is whether a crime was committed
beyond reasonable doubt.
Ven-Fuel was convicted of fraudulent acts,
By the Trial Court's finding of adequate facts.
We think it likely that fraud took place,
But materiality was not shown in this case. So while the
Government will no doubt be annoyed,
We declare the conviction null and void. 1
29
The headings in the case also told a story: "The Procedural Back-
ground Is Easily Stated," "But The Facts Are Far More Compli-
cated-, .... Applying the Law Is Even Worse," "But For the Reasons
Stated We Must Reverse." 130
One of Judge Brown's classics, City of Houston v. Federal A via-
tion Administration,"' involved a suit challenging federal regulations
imposing a "perimeter rule" prohibiting air carriers from operating
nonstop flights between Washington National Airport and any airport
more than 1,000 statute miles away. The introduction was a hint of
things to come:
This flight from Houston, Texas to our Nation's Capital takes
us to both Dulles International and Washington National Air-
ports. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 701
et seq., will serve as our flight plan, and the Supreme Court as air
traffic control. In the course of our flight, our passengers-the
City of Houston, American Airlines and the Federal Aviation
Administration-will be informed of our conclusion that Depart-
ment of Transportation regulations imposing a "perimeter rule"
upon flights to and from Washington National Airport are valid
and thus, as we disembark, we shall deny the petitions for
review. 132
The headings parodied air traffic regulations, airlines, and their adver-
tisements. They included "One If By Land, Two If By Sea, and Three
If By Air," "Pre-Flight Procedure," "We've Only Just Begun," "The
Friendly Skies-Filled with Litigants," "Scope of Review-We're the
129. Ven-Fuel, 602 F.2d at 749.
130. Id. at 749-50, 752-53.
131. 679 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1982).
132. Id. at 1186.
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Administrative Agency, Doing What We Do Best," and "You
Deserve National Attention?"' 33 Judge Brown's opinion, however,
was not a hit with everyone. Plaintiff's losing lead counsel "deplored
the opinion as 'beyond the bounds of proper judicial demeanor' and
criticized the judge for apparently spending more time trying to be
comedic than analyzing the facts of the case." 134
D. The Best of the Rest
Judges Brown and Goldberg do not have a monopoly on the use
of imagery and humor. The following excerpts show that on occasion
judges throughout the country have used color to liven their opinions
or to make a point.
13 5
1. THE ANIMAL MENAGERIE
Cases involving animals often provide judges with comic mate-
rial. The three cases that follow involve deer, dogs, and birds.
In United States v. Dowden,'36 the defendant was charged with
shooting a full grown deer in a national forest because the animal was
a fawn within the meaning of a Louisiana statute. Judge Dawkins
found that the deer was not a fawn despite its lack of horns, and
acquitted the defendant. His opinion eulogized the deer and chastized
the government for bringing the suit:
A tiny tempest in a tinier teapot has brought forth here all the
ponderous powers of the Federal Government, mounted on a
Clydesdale in hot pursuit of a private citizen who shot a full-grown
deer in a National Forest.
133. Id. at 1186-87, 1189-90.
134. John Brown's Bawdy, Legal Times, July 26, 1982, at 3, col. 3. Although the attorney's
reaction was understandable given his lack of success, his attack is probably unfounded. It is
likely that these headings (like unfunny ones) were formulated after the opinion was drafted
and were tailored to the court's results. Nevertheless, Judge Brown has acknowledged that,
although he does not use humor disparagingly, his words have sometimes caused
embarrassment to others. In those cases, he has regretted his use of humor. Telephone
Interview with Judge John Brown (Feb. 2, 1987).
135. Without intending to demean any litigants, it should be noted that some cases are
"funny" simply because of their subject matter. See, e.g., Norman v. Reagan, 95 F.R.D. 476
(D. Or. 1982) (complaint alleging that President Reagan had caused "civil death" without
legislation); United States ex rel Mayo v. Satan and His Staff, 54 F.R.D. 282 (W.D. Pa. 1971)
(denying plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis because of doubts about the court's
personal jurisdiction over the defendant); Frank v. NBC, 119 A.D.2d 252, 506 N.Y.S.2d 869
(1986) (holding that Saturday Night Live skit did not defame a tax accountant).
Courts sometimes write humorously unintentionally. In one case, for example, a court
stated that "[o]f course murder without due process by a person acting under color of state law
denies a federal right." Villaneuva v. Mclnnis, 723 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 1984) (emphasis
added).
136. 139 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. La. 1956).
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Not content with embarrassing defendant by this prosecution,
and putting him to the not inconsiderable expense of employing
counsel, the Government has compounded calumny by calling the
poor dead creature a "fawn." Otherwise fully equipped with all
the accouterments of virile masculinity, the deceased, alas, was a
"muley." Unlike other young bucks, who could proudly preen
their points in the forest glades or the open meadows, this poor
fellow was foredoomed to hide his head in shame: by some queer
quirk of Nature's caprice, he had no horns, only "nubbins," less
than an inch in length.
Instead of giving him a quiet, private internment and a "requi-
escat in pace," which decency should have dictated as his due, the
Government has filed his blushing head in evidence for all to see.
Pointing to the lack of points, to prove its point, it now insists that,
whatever his status may have been in other climes, in Louisiana
our departed friend is officially puerile.' 37
Proving that deer do not have a monopoly among animals as
objects of judicial humor, super DEA agent Paul Markonni's3 8
canine zeal in apprehending drug couriers provided the facts which
led to an opinion riddled with puns. After receiving information that
an airline passenger's companions had been caught with drugs,
Markonni had the airline locate the passenger's bags. Because no
drug dogs were available, he proceeded to smell the bags for the odor
of marijuana. He "alerted" to two of the bags, and used his "detec-
tion" to apply for a search warrant. A magistrate issued a warrant,
and the passenger-turned-defendant argued that he should have been
able to cross-examine Markonni before the warrant was issued. In
United States v. Sentovich 139 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit upheld the defendant's conviction. Judge John-
son's opinion for the court played on Markonni's canine sense -of
smell:
The ubiquitous DEA Agent Paul Markonni once again sticks
his nose into the drug trade. This time he is on the scent of appel-
lant Mitchell Sentovich's drug courier activities. We now learn
that among Markonni's many talents is an olfactory sense we in
the past attributed only to canines. Sentovich argues that he
should have been able to test, at a magistrate's hearing on issuance
of a search warrant, whether Markonni really is the human blood-
hound he claims to be. Sentovich's claims, however, have more
137. Id. at 781-82.
138. In a WESTLAW search, Markonni's name appeared in 51 cases from the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits. Markonni has a very good batting average in those two circuits: The courts
have upheld most of his searches and arrests of drug couriers as valid.
139. 677 F.2d 834 (11th Cir. 1982).
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bark than bite. In fact, they have not a dog's chance of success.
Zeke, Rocky, Bodger and Nebuchadnezzar, and the drug dogs of
the southeast had best beware. Markonni's sensitive proboscis may
soon put them in the dog pound....
Markonni emerges with his nose unbloodied and his tail wag-
ging. Sentovich's claims are without merit. Having also reviewed
the evidence, we find it sufficient for his conviction. "
Judge William Mulligan, in his last opinion for the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit before retiring, played the
role of a stand-up comic. The case, United States v. Byrnes, 14'
involved the smuggling of rare swans from Canada. Calling the opin-
ion his "swan song," Judge Mulligan labeled the defendants' appeal a
"rara avis:"
Canadian geese have been regularly crossing, exiting, reentering
and departing our borders with impunity, and apparently without
documentation, to enjoy more salubrious climes. Those unwilling
or unable to make the flight either because of inadequate wing
spans, lack of fuel or fear of buck shot, have become prey to
unscrupulous traffickers who put them in crates and ship them to
American ports of entry with fraudulent documentation in viola-
tion of a host of federal statutes.
1 42
Not all interested readers, however, were amused by Judge Mulligan's
humor. Despite the comic relief, the Second Circuit affirmed the
defendants' convictions.
2. POETRY, FABLES, AND SUPPOSED DECISIONS
One of the literary devices most often used by judges is the
140. Id. at 835-36, 838 (footnotes omitted). For a light-hearted opinion involving a cat, see
Calleja v. Wiley, 290 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (Mann, C.J.).
141. 644 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981).
142. Id. at 109 (footnote omitted). The New York Times ran a small article on Judge
Mulligan's opinion. See Conceit From a Judge's Lofty Perch, N.Y. Times, March 19, 1981, at
20, col. 3 (national edition).
Apparently, humor concerning animals knows no political boundaries. Conservative
judges, like their liberal colleagues, also write humorously about the subject. Kirchoff v.
Flynn, 786 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1986) involved an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988. The underlying § 1983 action featured pigeons, dogs, and marauding macaws: The
plaintiff had been charged with feeding pigeons in a park, allowing her dogs to run unleashed,
and with resisting arrest. Judge Frank Easterbrook, a Reagan appointee, commented on the
charge of allowing dogs to run unleashed:
The charge concerning the dogs was more substantial. . . . The penalty for
allowing dogs to run unleashed in the park is time in the pound (for the dogs
only), see Section 30-7.10. The prosecutor asked for 30 days, but the judge
apparently sentenced the dogs to time served.
Id. at 321. Some of Judge Easterbrook's footnotes also evoked laughter. See id. at 320 n.l, 321
n.2.
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poem. 143 Whether it is an original or a variant of a famous one, the
poem has been a staple of judicial imagery and humor.
In Fisher v. Lowe '44 the owner of a tree sued the driver and
owner of a car that had crashed into the tree. The syllabus, the head-
notes, and the opinion were all written in verse. Judge Gillis' opinion,
composed of six stanzas, affirmed a judgment for the defendants:
We thought that we would never see
A suit to compensate a tree.
A suit whose claim in tort is prest
Upon a mangled tree's behest;
A tree whose battered trunk was prest
Against a Chevy's crumpled crest;
A tree that faces each new day
With bark and limb in disarray;
A tree that may forever bear
A lasting need for tender care.
Flora lovers though we three,
We must uphold the court's decree.' 4 '
During the sixth game of the 1986 World Series between the Bos-
ton Red Sox and the New York Mets, a parachutist landed in Shea
Stadium with a Mets banner. The parachutist, Michael Sergio,
pleaded guilty to criminal trespassing and was sentenced to 100 hours
of community service and a $500 fine. Queen's Criminal Court Jus-
tice Phyllis Flug's sentencing order in State v. Sergio tracked Clement
Clarke Moore's A Visit from St. Nicholas:
'Twas game six of the series when out of the sky
Flew Sergio's parachute, a Met banner held high.
His goal was to spur our home team to success,
Burst Beantown's balloon claiming Sox were the best.
The fans and the players cheered all they did see
But not everyone present reacted with glee
"Reckless endangerment," the D.A. spoke stern.
"I recommend jail. There a lesson he'd learn."
Though the act proved harmless, on the field he didn't belong,
His trespass was sheer folly, and undeniably wrong.
But jail's not the answer in a case of this sort.
To balance the equities is the job of this court.
So a week before Christmas, here in the court,
I sentence defendant for interrupting a sport.
Community service, and a fine you will pay.
143. See supra note 78.
144. 122 Mich. App. 418, 333 N.W. 2d 67 (1983).
145. Id. at 419, 333 N.W. 2d at 67. The syllabus in the West reporter also provided a
lyrical summary of the dispute.
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Happy holiday to all. And to all a good day.
14 6
Like criminal law, the solemn world of bankruptcy is not
immune from imagery and humor. Bankruptcy Judge A. Jay Cristol,
in In re Love,' 47 denied his own sua sponte motion to dismiss a chap-
ter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. He did so in style, drafting his opinion
as a poem in the format of Edgar Allan Poe's The Raven:
Once upon a midnight dreary, while I pondered weak and weary
Over many quaint and curious files of chapter seven lore
While I nodded nearly napping, suddenly there came a tapping
As of some one gently rapping, rapping at my chamber door,
"Tis some debtor," I muttered, "tapping at my chamber door-
Only this and nothing more."
Ah distinctly I recall, it was in the early fall
And the file still was small
The Code provided I could use it
If someone tried to substantially abuse it
No party asked that it be heard.
"Sua sponte" whispered a small black bird.
The bird himself, my only maven, strongly looked to be a raven.
Perhaps this case is wrongly placed.
This is a thought that I must face, perhaps
I should dismiss this case.
I moved sua sponte to dismiss it
for I knew I would not miss it
The Code said I could, I knew it.
But not exactly how to do it, or perhaps some day I'd rue it.
I leaped up and struck my gavel,
For the mystery to unravel.
Could I? Should I? Sua sponte, grant my motion to dismiss?
Who would be the appellee?
Surely, it would not be me.
Who would file, but pray tell me,
a learned brief for the appellee.
The District Judge would not do so
At least this much I do know.
146. See And to All a 'Play Ball!,' New York Times, Dec. 20, 1986, at 1, col. 2 (national
edition). Other judges also use poetry in their orders. United States District Judge Thomas
Scott refused to release reputed organized crime figure Joseph Paterno from jail on pretrial
bond even though Paterno was dying from cancer. Judge Scott quoted Shakespeare in a
footnote: "The weariest and most loathed worldly life that age, ache and penury and
imprisonment can lay on life is a paradise to what we fear of death." See Legal Briefs, Miami
Herald, Dec. 8, 1986, at 2B, col. 6.
147. 61 Bankr. 558 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
19871
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Tell me raven, how to go.1
4 8
Not all rhymed opinions have been written by judges. In State v.
Lewis, 149 a nineteenth century case, the defendant was convicted of
escaping from custody while awaiting trial on burglary charges. The
Supreme Court of Kansas upheld the conviction, holding that the
defendant's acquittal on the burglary charges was not a defense to the
charge of escape. A Kansas lawyer, believing that a great injustice
had been done, penned a rhymed version of the case.
Statement of Case, by Reporter
This defendant, while at large,
Was arrested on a charge
Of burglarious intent,
And direct to jail he went.
But he somehow felt misused,
And through prison walls he oozed,
And in some unheard-of shape
He effected his escape.
LEWIS, tried for this last act,
makes a special plea of fact:
"Wrongly did they me arrest,
"As my trial did attest,
"And while rightfully at large,
"Taken on a wrongful charge.
"I took back from them what they
"From me wrongly took away."
Opinion of the Court. PER CURIAM:
We-don't-make-law. We are bound
To interpret it as found.
The defendant broke away;
When arrested, he should stay.
This appeal can't be maintained,
For the record does not show
Error in the court below,
And we nothing can infer.
148. Id. at 558-59. The syllabus and the headnote of the opinion were also in verse. The
headnote read:
Sua sponte dismissal would be error,
Though authority in Code is there,
To eschew abuse of consumer debt,
As presumption for debtor must be met.
Bankr. Code, I I U.S.C.A. § 707(b).
Id. at 558.
149. 19 Kan. 260, 27 A.R. 113 (1878).
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Let the judgment be sustained-
All the justices concur."'
The rhymed reporter's statement was included in the official reports,
apparently by a clerk who was amused by it and worked it into the
reports without consulting anyone. The Supreme Court of Kansas
apparently did not share the clerk's sense of humor-it fired the
prankster. 51
Following in the footsteps of Aesop, some judges have used
fables to make a point (especially a moral one). 52 A good example of
this literary device can be found in Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Memo-
rial Hospital.153 In Hatfield, a medical malpractice action, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit certified a question to
the Supreme Court of Nebraska. The question certified was whether a
statute of limitations on professional negligence actions was tolled
during the infancy of an injured minor. Chief Judge Lay dissented,
arguing that neither party had asked for certification and that the pro-
cedure would work to deny justice by causing delay in a case that was
already four years old. He appended a fable, "An Exercise In Time
and Music," to his dissent to make his point. The fable concerned a
virtuoso violinist who had made it to the finals of a national violin
concerto in the year 2001. The judges who had selected him, how-
ever, could not make up their minds about the other finalists, and the
contest was continued until the next year:
In December of 2002 the judges were still reviewing the composi-
tions for the year 2001 and once again the 2001 contest was post-
poned.... However, in 2003, the judges were so engaged with the
contest for that year they forgot about the 2001 contestants and the
2001 contest was once again postponed until 2004.... When Wil-
helm's parents finally received the invitation for Wilhelm to play,
they regretfully replied that they no longer could afford to send
Wilhelm to the contest. The committee notified them, under the
circumstances, they would finance Wilhelm's appearance. In
response, however, Wilhelm... notified the committee that he...
was no longer interested in playing. He wrote that he had given up
the idea of becoming a concert violinist and had decided he would
150. 19 Kan. 266 (1878).
151. See Buchmeyer, Criminal Law: The Escape, TEX. B.J., April, 1982, at 541. Other fake
opinions have found their way into legal publications. For the story behind a fictitious
Canadian case, Regina v. Ojibway, 8 Crim. L. Q. 37 (Ontario S. Ct. 1965), see Buchmeyer,
Judicial Logic: Birds & Ponies, TEX. B.J., October, 1982, at 1345-46.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 66 & 67.
153. 701 F.2d 1266 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
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be better off to become a music judge.' 54
The judicial use of fables is not a recent phenomenon. Dissenting in a
1916 case, Van Kleeck v. Ramer,' Justice Scott of the Supreme
Court of Colorado used a fable to warn about the dangers of blind
adherence to precedent:
One day through the primeval wood
A calf walked home, as good calves should;
But left a trail all bent askew,
A crooked trail, as all calves do.
Since then, three hundred years have fled,
And, I infer, the calf is dead.
But still he left behind his trail,
and thereby hangs my moral tale.
For men are prone to go it blind
Along the calf-paths of the mind,
And toil away from sun to sun
To do what other men have done.
They follow in the beaten track,
And out and in, and forth and back,
And still their devious course pursue
To keep the path that others do.' 56
Judges today still disagree over the proper use of precedent, but it is
unlikely that they have expressed their views as uniquely as did Jus-
tice Scott.
IV. CONCLUSION
Here's to the Judges who use a rhyme or two,
Or employ figurative language to give readers a clue.
By taking time their opinions to mull,
They show us that law need not be confusing or dull.
Judicial imagery and humor need not be dreadful. When used
appropriately, figurative language can add levity, help make a point,
or simply make an opinion fun to read. It can also help a judge avoid
boredom. As Justice Richard Wallach of the Supreme Court of New
York has noted,
It must immediately be conceded that the place of judicial
opinions is rather low in the literary pantheon; as an art form they
154. Id. at 1273 (Lay, C.J., dissenting). For a report on Chief Judge Lay's fable, see Wise &
Berreby, The Tale's The Thing, Nat'l L. J., April 11, 1983, at 39, col. 1.
155. 62 Col. 4, 156 P. 1108 (1916).
156. Id. at 44-45, 156 P. at 1121 (Scott, J., dissenting).
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probably rank slightly above a political speech and just below a
sermon....
Despite all this, I would urge that a touch of humor, carefully
controlled, can properly find a place in judicial writing. At best, it
can be useful in deflating the overblown argument; at worst (pro-
vided it is not nasty and therefore not humorous at all) it is proba-
bly harmless. And at least I can attest that over my fourteen years
of judicial opinionating it has relieved the tedium of the writer.
Whether it can ever relieve the tedium of the reader can [only] be
tested by time. 157
Law reflects society and culture. At its best, the legal system acts
as a peaceful means of solving the disputes that are bound to occur in
a world of ever-increasing complexity. At its worst, it discourages
mediation and settlement and complexifies a problem that was not so
difficult when it arose. As a result, fewer people are able to under-
stand the legal system. There are no easy solutions to this latter prob-
lem. One small step, however, might be to recognize that better use of
language by judges may make law more comprehensible to the public.
Figurative language, by deemphasizing "legalese," helps bring law
back to its most elemental form, the panoply of human experiences
from which it arose.
The judges whose talents have appeared on the pages of this arti-
cle have added life to legal problems through the use of creative writ-
ing. They have shown that figurative language, in the hands of good
writers, can be a legitimate tool in shaping legal discourse. In the
words of James White, "[i]t is .. .never enough to read a poem or
opinion for its main idea, which is often, when simply stated, simply
trite or meaningless .... In both cases the interesting question is not
what the main idea is but how it is given meaning in particular by the
oppositions that are its life."' 58 By encouraging the use of figurative
language in judicial opinions, we will go a long way towards recogniz-
ing that legal writing, and law itself, need not be static or
commonplace.
ADALBERTO JORDAN*
157. Wallach, Let's Have a Little Humor, N.Y.L.J., March 30, 1984, at 2, col. 3. For one of
Wallach's light-hearted opinions, see Hawkeye Distilling Co. v. New York State Liquor Auth.,
118 Misc. 2d 505, 460 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1986).
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